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 This dissertation aims to study the evolution of the compliance levels from 2006 to 2010 in two 
realities, Portugal and the USA, in a comparative study. Another topic that will be addressed is the 
evolution, during the same period, of the amount and quality of the reports made by obliged entities. In 
order to complete these goals, state-of-the-art literature on the topic was reviewed and relevant reports 
of each country were analyzed. 
 With this information in hand, it was possible to compare both countries in the evolution of: the 
number of reports filled in, with both a data and a graphical analysis; the quality level of the same 
reports, by using a quality report ratio, which represents the number of reports per investigation started; 
and the compared level of compliance between Portugal and the USA, with a descriptive analysis of the 
main changes performed. 
The main conclusions taken in this dissertation include the fact that Portuguese reports have 
been increasing in terms of quality, although the situation in terms of quantity is not improving. The USA 
has had a high and constant number of reports throughout the whole period in study, maintaining, 
however, a low but constant level of quality. Finally, in terms of the level of compliance evolution, both 
countries show a trend of convergence, with Portugal having a very positive evolution in the latest years 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Problem Statement 
This dissertation’s main subject is Financial Crime and Compliance, particularly the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing topics (hereon referred as AML and CTF, respectively) in 
Portugal and the USA. Therefore, an exploratory study will be performed, based on the FATF reports 
from both countries. 
In this respect, this dissertation’s research aims to study the evolution of the compliance levels 
of both Portugal and the USA since the FATF third mutual evaluation round in 2006 until 2010, with a 
special focus on the progress of reporting of suspicious actions of the entities subject to those new 
regulations. 
In order to develop a clearer perspective of this objective, I have developed some research 
questions, to which I propose to answer until the end of this dissertation: 
a. What is the impact that more legislation and greater awareness of the problem of money 
laundering have in terms of the reports delivered by subject entities? 
b. After the changes performed since 2006, what can be taken from the USA case in order to 
improve the Portuguese reality, in terms of its level of compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations? 
In both questions the methodology in use will be an exploratory study, with a descriptive and 
comparative approach. Addressing the first research question, the problem will be analyzed 
quantitatively, both with a data and a graphical analysis. The second research question study will be 
based on descriptive information, which illustrates the evolution that has taken place in the latest years 
and that allows for a comparison between both realities. 
 
2. Dissertation Structure 
After this brief introduction, this dissertation is comprised of four other chapters. 
In Chapter 2 there is a review of state-of-the-art literature in the AML/CTF theme, with the goal 
of framing the research questions and hypothesis that will be studied afterwards. 
In Chapter 3 there is a conceptual framework that illustrates the trail of thought followed in 
order to attain the hypothesis in study. Following this information, information on the compliance of 
both countries in 2006 is analyzed, as a basis to the study that is going to be done in the rest of the 
2 
 
dissertation. Finally, there is a brief approach to the methodology used to obtain the information that 
was used  in order to reach the results used thenceforward.  
Chapter 4 contains the results and their discussion, which is made according to the methodology 
explained in Chapter 3.  
This discussion leads to Chapter 5, which contains the conclusions of the study, as well as its 
main limitations and possibilities of future research in the same topic.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
a. Basic Concepts 
Before starting the analysis of the problem in particular, it is important to frame some basic 
terminologies of this specific topic. 
The worldwide most accepted definition of money laundering is the one used in the United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 1988 – Vienna 
Convention - and in the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in 2000 – 
Palermo Convention (Schott, 2006): 
• “The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from any [drug 
trafficking] offense or offenses or from an act of participation in such offense or offenses, for 
the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person 
who is involved in the commission of such an offense or offenses to evade the legal 
consequences of his actions; 
• The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights 
with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an 
offense or offenses or from an act of participation in such an offense or offenses, and; 
• The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the time of receipt that such property 
was derived from an offense or offenses or from an act of participation in such offense…or 
offenses” (United Nations, 1988, Article 3, no.1 b) and c) (i); United Nations, 2000, Article 6, 
no.1). 
Basically, “money laundering is the criminal's way of trying to ensure that, in the end, crime pays” 
(McDowell, Novis, 2008), because it is a way for criminals to disguise the origin of the money that is 
being laundered, which may come from drug trafficking or organized crime, for example (McDowell, 
Novis, 2008). 
Concerning terrorism financing, its definition was approved in the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 1999, by the United Nations. The agreement was on: 
“Any person commits an offense within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any 
means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willingly, provides or collects funds with the intention that 
they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: 
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• An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties 
listed in the annex; or 
• Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other 
person not taking any active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the 
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing an act” (United 
Nations, 1999, Article 2 nº1). 
 
b. Background 
Money laundering is a crime that, usually, involves large sums of cash (in 1996 it was estimated 
by the IMF that “money laundering ranged between US Dollar (USD) 590 billion and USD 1.5 trillion”
1
), 
making it a harmful externality for the economy. Furthermore, many times, it is an activity that is related 
to other types of crime. In fact, when criminal funds are derived from robbery, extortion, embezzlement 
or fraud, a money laundering investigation may be the only way to find the money’s path
1
. Furthermore, 
this type of crime is more susceptible in emerging countries, as there is an increased effort of the major 
financial markets and of many OFC’s (Offshore Financial Center) to fight against money laundering, 
giving the image of a greater protection in these territories (McDowell, Novis, 2008). 
Generally, money launderers split the large piles of cash in order to avoid detection from the 
authorities. They make use of common ways to store or invest money, such as opening bank accounts 
and purchasing securities, so that its trace is lost. Once, money laundering was used above all to 
undercover the proceeds from tax evasion and fraud, having, nowadays, expanded to other activities, 
such as “drug trafficking, other forms of transnational crime and corruption, and, most recently, the 
bankrolling of terrorism” (Marlin-Bennett, 2008). 
Historically, the USA and the UK were the first ones to criminalize money laundering. Particularly, 
the USA took the first legislative action AML in 1970 with the Bank Secrecy Act, obliging banks to report 
transactions over USD 10.000, followed by this crime’s definition as a separate criminal offense in 1986 
with the Money Laundering Control Act. Since then, both countries have been working together in order 
to make money laundering a worldwide recognized and legislated against crime (Kapstein, 1989). 







Indeed, money laundering may have devastating consequences both socially and economically, 
not only due to its large scale in terms of monetary values and people involved, but also in other aspects, 
such as: 
• Private Sector: Many times money is laundered through front companies, where criminals use 
their core business as a façade in order to hide the illegal profits. Moreover, as these criminals 
earn large profits with their illegal activities, they are able to maintain the front companies 
selling below the market average prices. This situation severely harms legally established 
companies, which are forced to compete with another that has a clear competitive advantage 
over them. 
• Financial Institutions: Money laundering may harm financial institutions in the sense that 
whenever these rely on the proceeds of this type of crime, they may suffer consequences in 
terms of their assets, liabilities or operations management. For example, due to these funds 
unexpected flows, if a bank receives a large sum of “dirty” money in one day it can be 
transferred away from that same bank in only a short period of time, which can create liquidity 
problems. 
• International Markets: Money launderers usually reinvest their funds in places where it is more 
advantageous in terms of detection and not only looking for the higher rates of return. This way, 
money laundering can provoke a misallocation of resources from artificial distortions in asset 
and commodity prices, as well as an increased volatility of international capital flows, interest 
and exchange rates. 
• Economic Distortion and Instability: Following the previously explained logic, money laundering 
can also harm economic growth, because criminals generally look for investment opportunities 
that hide the source of their proceeds, instead of looking for the highest return possible. 
• Tax Influence: This crime also reduces government’s tax revenues, harming tax payers, who 
have to pay more than they would if all the agents in the economy worked legally. 
• Privatization: Sometimes criminals have a greater buying power than legitimate purchasers, 
which in a privatization process can bring the company to the hands of a money launderer 
harming its business. 
• National Reputational Risk: Nowadays, countries are rigorously concerned with their country-
wide reputation, a concern that is greater with the global economy, with the confidence in 
markets and the profits benchmarks being very important. This way, a country’s negative 
reputation reduces legitimate businesses, augmenting the percentage of illegal ones from 
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international criminal organizations. Also, after losing its credibility, it is extremely difficult for a 
country to recover it, requiring its government to spend a great amount of resources in restoring 
the markets trust. 
• Social Consequences: Money laundering attracts other illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, 
which drastically increases the government’s spending in security and healthcare, decreasing 
the overall population lifestyle level (McDowell and Novis, 2008). 
 
On the other hand, terrorism financing is a much more recent concept, which was only generally 
defined in 1999, as explained previously. However, this definition, contrarily to the one of money 
laundering, is subject to much more subjectivity, due to the divergences in political, religious and 
national issues that vary in a country-wide basis. Nonetheless, this concept has evolved in the following 
years, especially after September of 2001 and the terrorist attacks, after which FATF developed its nine 
Special Recommendations (Schott, 2006). 
Terrorism has several grave consequences both economically and socially, with some of these 
being direct and the others indirect. 
Direct consequences of terrorism include the destruction of life and property, the costs with the 
restoration of the systems and infrastructures and the emergency and assistance services needed and 
usually occur right in the aftermath of the terrorist attack. Direct economic consequences of terrorism 
are generally proportionate to the strength of the attacks, along with the size and characteristics of the 
economy that suffered the attack (Johnston and Nedelescu, 2005). 
On the other hand, indirect consequences also take place, especially in the medium and long 
term. At first, customer and investor’s confidence is affected, which may cause a “generalized drop in 
asset prices and a flight to quality that increases the borrowing costs for riskier borrowers” (IMF, 2001b). 
In the long run, terrorism can also have a negative impact on productivity, as transaction costs will rise 
through the increase of security measures, higher insurance premiums, or the increase of financial and 





2. International Standard Setters 
a. United Nations 
The UN was the first organization to fight money laundering in an international basis with the 
Vienna Convention in 1988, mentioned above. Also, it is one of the best prepared organizations to 
prevent this type of crime worldwide, not only due to its expansion and overall acceptance, having 191 
country members, but also due to its constant action on the disclosure and prevention of money 
laundering and, subsequently, terrorism financing2. 
Nowadays, the UN has a specific division in order to deal with these crimes and others related 
with corruption and drug trafficking – the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. UNODC’s main 




“The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the 
development and promotion of policies, both at national and international levels, to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing”
4
. 
In order to do so, after its creation in 1989, it has developed a series of Recommendations and 
Special Recommendations, regulating AML and CTF respectively. Besides the establishment of these 
recommendations, FATF has updated them through the years. Furthermore, FATF monitors its members 
progress in implementing the necessary measures in order to comply with the recommendations
2
. 
c. Egmont Group 
The Egmont Group was created in 1995, in order to allow the different FIU’s to better 
communicate between themselves, cooperating in the combat to money laundering and terrorism 
financing, enabling the implementation of country-wide programs in these areas
5
. 
Examples of this influence are the training offered and the promotion of personal exchanges, for 
a more effective action of each FIU, and the creation of the Egmont Secure Web (ESW), for a better and 




A Financial Intelligence Unit “is a central office that obtains financial report information, 
processes it in some way and then discloses it to an appropriate government authority in support of a 











national anti-money laundering effort”
6
. Nowadays, these play a significant role in the AML and CTF 
processes, being responsible for the development of a relationship between financial and non-financial 
institutions and the law enforcement authorities responsible for the investigation and repression of 
these crimes. In addition, FIU’s also assure the protection of the data shared by companies, creating an 
incentive for the participation of these in the information sharing cycle
5
. 
 There are four different FIU models, depending on the institution that manages it: 
• Judicial: The FIU is linked to the national judicial system, working in a way that allows for the 
information received to, directly and when justifiable, start a judicial process. Its greatest 
advantage is the FIU’s independence from political power, along with an easier triggering of 
judicial processes. However, this model may decrease the availability of companies to share 
information, as the intermediary is directly linked with an institution with a great power over 
them, in case a crime is detected. 
• Law Enforcement: FIU’s are dependent of a law enforcement or security force system. This 
model allows a simpler access to the national and international police databases for the FIU, 
having a greater support for the investigation that is being held. Notwithstanding, similarly to 
judicial FIU’s, as companies are dealing with a form of authority, they can become less receptive 
to the idea of sharing information, being necessary a prior proof of the cooperation relationship 
between them. 
• Administrative: In this model, the FIU works under the management of a centralized and 
independent authority, making the bridge between companies and the judicial and law 
enforcement systems. Its main advantage is its independence from either the companies or 
obliged entities and the authorities. Even though this represents an advantage, it can also have a 
perverse effect. Due to its complete independence, the FIU is also further from the information 
sources, along with is distance from the investigation itself. 
• Hybrid: The FIU’s model is mixed if it has features of two or more of the above referred models. 
In this case, the advantages and disadvantages are the same as the ones from the models that 
constitute the hybrid model (Gleason and Gottselig, 2004). 
 
3. Standard AML/CTF Regulation 
a. FATF Recommendations 
In order to fight money laundering, FATF has established the 40 FATF Recommendations in 1990, 
following the Vienna Convention of 1988. These recommendations were revised in 1996 and 2003 by 
9 
 
“FATF members, non-members, observers, financial and other affected sectors and interested parties”
6
, 
keeping it in accordance with current times, while being accepted by both the IMF and the World Bank. 
Moreover, there are the FATF IX Special Recommendations, which address the financing of 
terrorism. These were created in 2001 and revised in 2003 and 2004, being also accepted worldwide as 
paradigm of prevention and detection of terrorism financing. 
b. European Directive 2005/60/EC, of 26 October 
The European Parliament and Council have elaborated Directive 2005/60/EC, of 26 October, as a 
response to money laundering and other crimes with which it is connected. This Directive was 
developed in accordance with FATF Recommendations and Special Recommendations, repealing 
Directive 91/308/EEC, of 10 June (Directive 2005/60/EC, of 26 October). 
As explained before, money laundering and terrorism financing are usually committed 
internationally, requiring an overall coordinated reply, instead of simply a national or Community 
initiative, which would produce limited effects. Therefore, the countries present in the EU, are enforced 
to comply with this Directive as a whole (Directive 2005/60/EC, of 26 October). 
This Directive determines, in general, the scope, definitions and subjects exposed to the 
legislation, the rules related with customer due diligence, reporting obligations, record keeping and 
statistical data and other enforcement measures (Directive 2005/60/EC, of 26 October). 
Complementary to this Directive, the European Parliament and Council have established 
another Directive, 2006/70/EC, of 1 August, in order to define the concept of PEP and the technical 
criteria for simplified customer due diligence procedures for exemption on grounds of a financial activity 
conducted on an occasional or very limited basis (Directive 2006/70/EC, of 1 August). 
c. Consequences of Non-Compliance 
Even though these reports contain “recommendations”, they are not merely voluntary, since the 
IMF and the World Bank perceive them as models of good financial governance, increasing these 
recommendations and FATF’s importance in the AML and CTF actions. This relevance brings 
consequences for the countries that do not comply with the established rules (Marlin-Bennett, 2008). 
The direct consequence of non-compliance is the listing of countries in a set of Non-Compliant 
Countries and Territories (NCCT). The inclusion in this group, besides hurting a country’s reputation 
overseas, grants foreign complying countries the authority to apply countermeasures against non-
compliant countries, as explained in FATF Recommendation 21: “Financial institutions should give 
                                                          
6
 See FATF 40 Recommendations, Introduction. 
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special attention to business relationships and transactions (…) from countries which do not or 
insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations. (…) Where such a country continues not to apply or 
insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations, countries should be able to apply appropriate 
countermeasures” (FATF 40 Recommendations). A non-compliant country can even reach a situation in 
which the major financial markets no longer accept trading with them, which may also occur with 
specific companies or institutions (Johnston and Nedelescu, 2005). 
Besides countries, financial institutions should also make sure that the principles that are valid 
for them are also applied to branches and majority owned subsidiaries located abroad. This 
recommendation gains importance in countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF 
Recommendations. However, the only exception to the enforcement of FATF Recommendations is in the 
case that local applicable laws and regulations do not permit this implementation, in which case, 
according to FATF Recommendation 22, “competent authorities in the country of the parent institution 
should be informed by the financial institutions that they cannot apply the FATF Recommendations” 
(FATF 40 Recommendations). 
Moreover, an effort has been made by FATF and its regional bodies (FSRB – FATF Style Regional 
Bodies) in order to further improve the AML regulation in regional terms. This joint work was mostly 
done through feedback and mutual evaluations, having proven to be effective, illustrated by the 
shortage verified in the list of NCCT’s in the last years (FATF, 2007). 
Additionally, there are several risks for individual financial institutions inside a country if a 
money laundering or terrorism financing situation occurs. Firstly, the reputation risk is the potential that, 
due to negative publicity, or suspicions or allegations of money laundering or terrorism financing, there 
will be a loss of confidence in the integrity of the financial institution, creating a sense of mistrust from 
its counterparts and reducing the probability of that institution to do business with others. Also, the 
operational risk is the potential that a given institution is not able to adequately apply or manage 
internal processes, people and systems, such as the application of CDD processes, creating a greater 
exposure of the financial institution to money laundering activities. Moreover, the legal risk is the 
possibility of law suits, adverse judgments, unenforceable contracts, fines and penalties generating 
losses or increased expenses for an institution, or even closure of such an institution. Finally, the 
concentration risk comes from an unidentified clients’ identity. Even though limits are established in 
what concerns a bank’s exposure to a single client or group of related clients, without instituting proper 
measures to precisely identify its clients, is becomes impossible for a bank to measure its concentration 
risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001). 
11 
 
4. Contrary Opinion About AML/CTF Frameworks 
Although the requirements for AML and CTF are already in place in most countries, the truth is 
that money laundering still exists in a large scale worldwide. In fact, the creation of organizations that 
regulate and legislate against AML and CTF is not a sufficient procedure in order to efficiently fight 
against money laundering and terrorism financing (Marlin-Bennett, 2008). 
 Furthermore, least developed economies and weaker jurisdictions and institutions may face 
difficulties in the implementation of the regulatory standards and recommendations, as these have 
rigorous legal and regulatory requirements (Johnston and Nedelescu, 2005). 
 Financial intermediaries do not always have a strong economic incentive to report suspicious 
transactions, once, today, the probability of criminal conviction is low and fines are still small 
comparatively to the amounts involved in the crime itself. Besides, when there is a large group of 
smaller clients, its cost of reporting becomes very high, while, on the other hand, high-class clients give a 
great importance to their privacy, changing their intermediary if any problems were risen (FitzGerald, 
2004). Moreover, while larger reporting entities have the structure to refuse clients who raise the 
slightest suspicion, smaller companies may tend to accept those clients, as long as their backgrounds do 
not reveal any problematic questions (Geiger and Wuensch, 2007). 
 Also, the creation, implementation and enforcement of criminal and civil law rules as well as 
banking regulation and supervision is in the competence of sovereign states. However, due to the 
growing globalization of the economy and financial services businesses, AML/CTF frameworks are 
coordinated internationally, so that international cooperation and preventive regulatory arbitrage can 
be promoted. This way, although members from each country are present in the FATF, they do not have 
the same decision power as they would have individually (Geiger and Wuensch, 2007). 
 In 2008, the United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement reported that, at that time, there were 57 major money laundering countries, with “far too 
many countries that boast solid AML/CTF standards and infrastructures are still simply not enforcing 
their laws. This is true in all corners of the world and for both developed and developing countries alike” 





5. AML/CTF Systems in Study 
a. Portugal7 
Portugal has one of the lowest crime report rate per capita in Europe (40,5% in the 2010 
balance), having only Greece behind. Reported car theft is one of the most reported crimes, although it 
has shrunk 10,1% between 2010 and 2009 (Sistema de Segurança Interna, 2010). Portuguese authorities 
believe that this crime is generally drug-related by the perpetrator. 
In fact, due to its geographical condition with a long coastline and vast territorial waters, along 
with its privileged relationships with South America, Portugal is a point of logistical support in the transit 
of drugs destined to other countries in Europe, coming from South America and North Africa. Other 
types of crime that have been detected in Portugal are: corruption, traffic of works of art and cultural 
artifacts, extortion, embezzlement, tax offences and aiding or facilitating illegal immigration. 
Furthermore, concerning the financing of terrorism, there is no clear evidence that there are 
Portuguese terrorist groups of any radical nationalist movements by foreign terrorist organizations 
inside Portugal. However, there are some indications that some of the criminal activity verified has 
contributed to support political parties or radical organizations active outside the Portuguese territory. 
Authorities also suspect that money remittance systems or cash couriers have been used to move funds. 
 
The main actors in Portugal concerning the AML/CTF system are divided between obliged 
entities and supervisory bodies or overseeing bodies. Besides, these can be from the financial sector or 
the non-financial one. 
The financial sector’s obliged entities are subdivided in: credit institutions, financial companies, 
other financial intermediaries in securities, other financial institutions and insurance companies and 
pension funds management companies. Since 1995, the Portuguese Future and Options Exchange works 
in agreement with the Lisbon Stock Exchange, creating the PSI-20, composed by the 20 Portuguese 
leading companies’ stocks. 
In Portugal banking institutions are the main source of funding for the domestic economy. This 
banking system has changed severely since the 1980’s, mostly due to the accession to the EU and to a 
consolidation process. In effect, most financial institutions in Portugal are consolidated within wider 
banking groups, with the system being concentrated around four big banking groups (BES, BCP, BPI and 
CGD), with the concentration rate in 2006 in approximately 75%, when there were still five players in the 
market. 
                                                          
7
 FATF 2006, Portugal, unless another source is referred throughout the text. 
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Insurance companies work entirely in insurance and reinsurance, together with the activities 
that are connected or complementary. According to Law 25/2008, of 5 June, insurance companies 
subject to the AML/CTF framework are just the ones that carry on activities within the area of life 
insurance. In Portugal, life insurance companies can also manage pension funds and insurance mutual 
funds are widely available as investment products. In the end of 2005, there were five companies 
dominating the market with 75% of market share (life) and 60% (non-life), with a trend that pointed to 
an even increasing concentration in the market. However, pension funds companies exclusively work in 
the management of pension funds, with a lower concentration rate (52,4% for the eight biggest 
companies in the end of 2005). 
The regulation and supervision to the Portuguese financial sector is performed by three 
institutions: the Bank of Portugal (Banco de Portugal – BdP); the Portuguese Insurance Institute 
(Instituto de Seguros de Portugal – ISP); and the Securities Market Commission (Comissão de Mercado 
de Valores Mobiliários – CMVM). In order to institutionalize and organize co-operation between these 
three supervising institutions, the National Council of Financial Supervisors was created in 2000. 
The BdP is the central bank of Portugal and is a part of the ESCB (European System of Central 
Banks) being responsible for the stability of the financial system, supervising all credit institutions and 
financial companies with their head office in Portugal. Internationally, the BdP has to manage the 
foreign assets of the country, act as an intermediary of the State’s international monetary relations and 
to advise the government on economic and financial matters. The ISP is responsible for the prudential 
supervision of insurance and re-insurance companies, insurance intermediaries, pension funds and their 
management. The CMVM is in charge for the supervision of securities markets and these markets rules 
of conduct. This last organization has powers to watch over the application of the law by the entities 
under its supervision, although it does not investigate any crimes, exactly as the other two regulatory 
entities. 
The non-financial sector, which is denominated Designated Non-Financial Businesses and 
Professions (DNFBP), is constituted by a great diversity of professionals and corporations. Lawyers, who 
have exclusive powers of attorney and are providers of legal advice. Solicitadores, which is a 
denomination exclusively used in Portugal, have a legal mandate to exercise specific responsibilities to 
carry out contracts and procedures covering all legal areas which are not restricted to lawyers. Notaries, 
who provide legal form and public faith to private acts and contracts. Statutory auditors, or ROC’s 
(Revisores Oficiais de Contas), who have the exclusive legal authority to monitor a given company’s 
accounts, according to the rules approved by their Professional Order and to the legal requirements 
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relating to the auditing of accounts. Chartered accountants, or TOC’s (Técnicos Oficiais de Contas), who 
plan, organize and co-ordinate the accounts of companies who are subject to corporation tax and who’s 
accountancy is registered according to official accounting plans. Besides ROC’s and TOC’s, also external 
auditors and fiscal consultants are subject to AML/CTF laws. Real estate agents, intermediaries and 
dealers, who search for and collect information on a property or promote property for business use. 
Casinos, which are private establishments owned by or that can revert to the State. Moreover, the State 
is the only one that is allowed to operate gambling amenities, with the casinos’ management being run 
only through a concession awarded by the State itself. Dealers of precious metals and stones, who need 
no license or authorization in order to run their business. Finally, every dealer that makes a transaction 
of value equal to or higher than € 15.000, independently of that transaction being completed in one or 
more operations. 
Each of these subdivisions have a correspondent overseeing entity: the Bar Association; the 
Chamber of Solicitadores; the Notaries and Registry Officials; the Professional Order of ROC’s and the 
Professional Order of TOC’s; the Authority for the Food and Economy Security (ASAE), which was known 
as IGAE before 2006; and the General Inspectorate for Gambling (IGJ), respectively. 
In Portugal, the FIU is the Unidade de Informação Financeira (UIF) and is of the law enforcement 
model, being connected with the Portuguese criminal police – Polícia Judiciária (PJ). UIF’s competences 
involve gathering, centralizing, collating and disseminating the information about the prevention and 
investigation of crimes as money laundering, terrorism financing and tax-related offences, at a national 
level. Moreover, it is responsible: for the cooperation and liaison with the judicial, supervision and 
control authorities as well as with financial and non-financial entities, internally; and for the cooperation 
with other FIU’s, internationally (Decree-Law No. 42/2009 of 12 February, Article 5). 
Another important organization in Portugal is the Central Department for Criminal Investigation 
and Prosecution (DCIAP – Departamento Central de Investigação e Acção Penal), which works on the 
dependency of the Prosecutor’s General Office. The DCIAP co-ordinates and controls the investigation 
and prevention of violent, highly organized or extremely complicated crime. It has authority to 
investigate crimes involving terrorist organizations, terrorism, corruption and money laundering, being 
able to carry out operations against the two last ones. Finally, the DCIAP carries out enquiries and 
promotes criminal proceedings whenever the criminal activity happens in areas that belong to distinct 




In Portugal, the main law concerning money laundering and terrorism financing regulation is 
Law 25/2008, of 5 June, which revokes Law 11/2004, of 27
 
March. This Law takes into account the EU 
Directives no. 2005/60/CE, of 26
 
October, of the European Parliament and no. 2006/70/CE, of 1 August, 
of the European Commission. 
This regulation starts with the definition of several concepts (article 2) relevant for AML/CTF, 
such as the ones of Politically Exposed Person (PEP), who are “natural persons who hold or who have 
held up to the previous twelve months prominent public or political functions and immediate family 
members, or persons known to be close associates of such persons through a business or commercial 
relationship” and Shell Bank, which is “a credit institution, incorporated in a State or jurisdiction in which 
it has no physical presence, involving meaningful mind and management, and which is unaffiliated with 
a regulated financial group”. Still in the general dispositions chapter, Law 25/2008, of 5 June, identifies 
the entities that are subject to the defined rules, meaning financial and non-financial entities (articles 3 
and 4), as well as the authorities that supervise them (article 38 to article 40). 
Article 6 to article 37 enumerate the general duties for all the entities defined earlier, as well as 
the individual duties corresponding to each type of entity separately. The duties applicable to all obliged 
entities are presented in a list below: 
• Duty of identification (article 7 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June): the obliged entities shall request and 
verify the identity of their clients and the respective representatives a) every time they start a 
business relationship, b) whenever they enter into transactions equal to or higher than € 15.000, 
c) when the transaction rises suspicions of involving funds coming from money laundering or 
terrorism financing activities, or d) when there are any doubts about the authenticity of 
customers’ identification data. 
• Duty of due diligence (article 9 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June): the obliged entities shall a) take the 
appropriate measures so that they are able to understand the ownership and control structure 
of the customer, b) obtain information on the purpose and the intended nature of the business 
relationship, c) obtain information on the origin and destination of the funds, d) continuously 
monitor the business relationship, or e) keep the information elements obtained during the 
business relationship up-to-date. 
• Duty of refusal (article 13 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June): the obliged entities shall refuse any 
transaction, business relationship or occasional transaction when a) the elements concerning 
the proper identification of the client, his/her representative or beneficial owner are not 
provided as stated in article 7, or b) the information concerning the ownership and control 
16 
 
structure of the customer, the nature and purpose of the business relationship and the origin 
and destination of the funds is not provided as stated in article 9. 
• Duty of document keeping (article 14 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June): a) the copies or references to 
the documents demonstrating compliance with the duty of identification and due diligence shall 
be kept for a period of seven years, counting from the moment in which the identification 
process takes place or when the business relationship ends, and b) any type of demonstrative 
documents containing records of the transactions shall always be kept for a period of seven 
years. 
• Duty of examination (article 15 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June): without prejudice to the enhanced 
customer due diligence duty, the obliged entities shall examine with particular care and 
attention any conduct, activity or transaction whose features are particularly likely to be related 
to money laundering or terrorism financing. 
• Duty of reporting (article 16 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June): the obliged entities shall inform both 
the DCIAP and the UIF every time they know or suspect that a given transaction is likely to 
incorporate a money laundering or terrorism financing offence, which may either have been 
attempted or consummated; these reports’ privacy shall always be kept, as these can only be 
used in a judicial trial. 
• Duty to refrain from carrying out transactions (article 17 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June): the obliged 
entities shall renounce to operations that are in any way connected or suspected to be 
connected to money laundering or terrorism financing, informing afterwards both the DCIAP 
and the UIF of its action; however, the mentioned operation may still occur either if it is not 
frozen by a judge in a period of two working days after the report has been made or if the 
refraining is not possible or may harm the future investigation of money laundering or terrorism 
financing. 
• Duty of cooperation (article 18 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June): the obliged entities shall readily 
provide the cooperation that may be requested by either the DCIAP, the UIF, the judicial 
authority responsible for leading the enquiry or by the competent authorities to ensure 
compliance with the duties. 
• Duty of secrecy (article 19 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June): the entities subject to the duties shall not 
disclose to their customers or to third parties (excluding the supervisory authorities and in cases 
when that information is critical for the investigation of a money laundering or terrorism 
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financing case) that they have made the reports legally due or that a criminal investigation is 
ongoing. 
• Duty of controlling (article 21 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June): the obliged entities shall create and 
apply adequate internal policies and procedures for the compliance with the duties, namely as 
far as internal control, evaluation and risk management and internal audit are concerned, so as 
to effectively prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. 
• Duty of training (article 22 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June): the obliged entities shall adopt the most 
appropriate measures so that those whose functions are relevant for the prevention of money 
laundering and terrorism financing, are able to develop their activity taking into account the 
obligations imposed by legislation and regulation in force concerning this matter. 
Finally, Law 25/2008, of 5 June, also defines the consequences for the obliged entities that do 
not comply with the rules defined above. According to article 54, the fines vary with the activity of the 
offender (financial of non-financial sector) and with its state as legal or natural person. Therefore, the 
fines applicable to a financial entity vary from €25.000 to €2.500.000 for a legal person and from 
€12.500 to €1.250.000 for a natural person, while the fines valid for a non-financial entity (lawyers and 
solicitadores are subject to different penalties) vary from €5.000 to €500.000 for a legal person and from 
€2.500 to €250.000 for a natural person. Along with these fines, article 55 establishes additional 
penalties, depending on the seriousness of the offence and guilt of the offender: a) prohibition from 
exercising the profession or activity to which the breach of regulations relates for a period of up to three 
years; b) prohibition from being member of management or auditing boards as well as from holding 
chief executive, senior management, or management and supervisory posts in legal persons subject to 
this law, where the offender already holds a position such as the ones mentioned; and c) publicity of the 
final decision  in one of the most read newspapers of the area where the offender has his/her head 
office or, in the case that he/she is a natural person, his/her residence, at the expense of the offender 
himself. 
For lawyers (article 58) and solicitadores (article 59) the consequences are similar, with an 
entailment of disciplinary proceedings in the Bar Association and in the Chamber of Solicitadores that 
can, according to their seriousness and regarding the violation of duties, lead to: a) a fine between 
€2.500 and €250.000; b) a two year suspension of activity; c) a suspension of activity between 2 to 10 
years; or d) expulsion. 
Besides Law 25/2008, of 5 June, there are Law 52/2003, of 22 August (with changes made in Law 
59/2007, of 4 September) and the CMVM Securities Code. The first one regards the prevention against 
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terrorist organizations and terrorism itself, while also addressing the penalties against this type of crime. 
The second regulates the securities exchange rules, defining the concepts involved and the crimes that 
can be involved with this type of transaction. 
b. USA8 
The USA signed and ratified the OECD 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Transactions and the Palermo Convention of 2001. Nevertheless, this protection 
against money laundering and other crimes does not happen just between the political class. Socially, 
individuals expect that the businesses with which they interact in their day-to-day activities will not have 
criminal connections, protecting themselves and their business relationships from any money laundering 
or terrorism financing threats and possibilities. 
In fact, apart from the civil and criminal penalties, offenders have a very high risk of getting their 
income and reputation levels shortened due to the negative publicity that these types of crimes arise. In 
addition, the USA media takes an active role in informing and denouncing the cases of money laundering 
and terrorism financing. All of these efforts create a culture of AML/CTF compliance in financial and non-
financial obliged entities. 
In the USA, drug trafficking profits represent a large fraction of the total of funds related with 
money laundering activities. Furthermore, it has been proven that cities with a higher amount of drug 
seizures are some of the ones with higher total assets seized (in US Dollars), namely New York, Miami 
and Los Angeles. In the group of the top ten asset seizures, the primary offences found, besides drug 
trafficking, are immigration violations, fraud and firearms violations. 
The most reported SAR (Suspicious Activity Report) is structured cash deposits followed by 
immediate and regular international wire transfers that are conducted through correspondent accounts 
either by individuals or businesses. Besides this way of laundering money others are also used, such as: 
bulk-cash smuggling; trade-based money laundering; insurance products; casinos; and money services 
businesses. 
On the other hand, terrorism financing remains a concern in the USA, mostly due to the 
influence of 9/11 and, afterwards, as a result of the possibility of performing SAR’s together with the 
publicity surrounding some financial institutions with customers and transactions with possible ties to 
terrorism. However, given the high criminal penalties associated with the involvement in terrorism 
                                                          
8
 FATF, 2006, USA, unless another source is referred throughout the text. 
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financing activities, almost no one openly acknowledges the intended terrorist-related use to which 
raised funds are to be applied. 
 
In the USA, the main actors are divided between obliged entities, supervision entities and 
institutional bodies. The obliged entities belong to one of two distinct sectors: financial or DNFBP’s. 
As financial entities, there are the banking sector, the securities sector, the insurance sector and 
the money services businesses. 
Inside the banking sector, institutions can work either at national or state level, being able to 
affiliate more broadly with securities and insurance underwriters since 1999, with the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Financial Modernization Act. Besides this distinction, banks may vary in size from global banks to 
regional and community banks. Global banks operate internationally, lending and trading currency, 
along with their usual business activities. Regional banks operate with several branches and ATM 
locations inside a multi-state area, providing banking services to individuals. Community banks are 
directed to small business markets, targeting retail and being based locally. Recently, online banks are 
proliferating, either as separate institutions or as expansions made by traditional banks. 
In the securities sector, brokerage firms can take three different forms: full-service; discount; or 
online organizations. Full-service brokers give advice to customers about the development of their 
investment portfolios, manage their investments and recommend which investments to buy. Discount 
firms generally do not offer advice about specific securities. Online brokerage offer their services 
through the internet, so that they are able to keep costs and fees at a low level. Moreover, brokerage 
firms also provide investment banking services, also advising businesses on merger and acquisition 
strategies. Finally, companies varying from very large mutual fund management to self-employed 
personal financial advisers or financial planners, which specialize in providing investment advice, 
portfolio management and trust, fiduciary and custody activities are also part of this sector. 
The insurance sector is divided by type of activity, between life, property/casual and health. 
Moreover, it is also possible to distinguish different distribution channels used by insurance companies 
in order to offer their products, such as: direct response marketing, by selling a policy directly to the 
insured; agents, who may be captive, representing just one insurance company, or independent, 
representing more than one insurance company; internet. 
The money services business sector is very large and diverse, ranging from very large and 
international companies, to small convenience stores in inner city neighborhoods. This sector 
encompasses: money transmitters; currency dealers and exchangers; check cashers; issuers of traveler’s 
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checks, money orders or stored value; and sellers or redeemers of traveler’s checks, money orders or 
stored value. 
 The DNFBP group is comprised of accountants, casinos, dealers in precious metals or stones, 
lawyers and other independent legal professionals, notaries public, real estate agents, trust and 
company service providers and the non-profit sector. 
 Accountants can be: public accountants, who provide accounting and auditing services on a fee 
basis; certified public accountants, who are accountants that have received a qualifying certificate from 
an authorized state entity; and accounting firms, which also provide financial and investment advice. 
Apart from their gaming facilities and services, casinos provide financial services, such as customer 
deposit or credit accounts and receiving transfers directly from other institutions. Dealers in precious 
metals or stones show great differences in size, in the sources of supply and in the business models used, 
varying from single artisan goldsmiths to publicly traded manufacturers and from large-scale producers 
to small dealers that sell unique and rare gemstones on an individual basis. Lawyers need to be licensed 
by an appropriate authority, such as a bar association. 
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is the administrative FIU of the USA. It was 
created in 1990 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, where it still belongs today, in order to “provide 
a government-wide multisource financial intelligence and analysis network”
9
. 
In practice, FinCEN main functions are: to receive and maintain financial transactions data; to 
analyze and disseminate that data for law enforcement purposes; and to build global cooperation with 
counterpart organizations in other countries and with international bodies. In addition, FinCEN 
administers the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), as amended by Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, along 
with other legislation (FinCen Annual Report, 2010). 
The BSA was instituted in 1970 and requires financial institutions from the USA, such as banks 
and insurance companies, to detect and prevent money laundering, by applying a series of procedures 
in their activities. Financial institutions are, therefore, obliged to keep records of cash purchases of 
negotiable instruments, while reporting cash transactions exceeding USD 10.000 (daily aggregate 
amount) and any other suspicious activity
10
. 
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 was established after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, 
enlarging the scope of the BSA by covering terrorism financing and money laundering. This Act has 












 The main legislation against money laundering and terrorism financing in the USA is comprised 
of Title 18 USC 1956 and 1957 for the first crime and of Title 18 USC 2339A, 18 USC 2339B and 18 USC 
2339C for the last one. In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act, established in 2001, amended some of the 
existent laws and regulations, enforcing the power of FinCEN and the Secretary of Treasure.  
However, Title III will be the only one from the USA PATRIOT Act addressed in this literature 
review, as it is the most relevant one in terms of the AML/CTF framework. It is divided in three subtitles: 
A - international counter money laundering and related measures; B – BSA amendments and related 
improvements; and C – Currency Crimes and Protection (USA PATRIOT Act). 
 Title 18 USC 1956 – Laundering of monetary instruments defines what is considered money 
laundering in subsections (a)(1)(A) (i) and (ii), (a)(2) (A) and (B)(i) and (a)(3) (A) and (B). These are 
followed by the penalties consequent to the practice of money laundering: the offender has to pay the 
greater value between the property, funds or monetary instruments involved in the transaction and USD 
10.000. In the case that the crime was enacted along with the avoidance of the transaction reporting 
requirement under State or Federal law, the offender is subject to a fine of a maximum of USD 500.000 
or twice the value of the property, funds or monetary instruments involved in the transaction and/or 
the imprisonment of the offender for a maximum of 20 years. Title 18 USC 1957 - Engaging in monetary 
transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, contrary to section 1956, criminalizes 
the proceeds of crime without the additional requirement that this spending be accompanied by the 
relevant criminal intent, as long as the monetary transaction at discussion has a value greater than USD 
10.000 and derives from a specified unlawful activity. The penalty for this crime is a fine under Title 18 
of the United States Code or, in the case the court finds it more appropriate, a fine of a maximum of 
twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the transaction, which can be coupled 
with imprisonment for a maximum of 10 years. 
 Title 18 USC 2339A – Providing material support to terrorists, as the Title’s designation indicates 
condemns everyone who “provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, 
location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to 
be used” (Title 18 USC 2339A (a)) in any kind of terrorist act. The penalty for this crime includes a fine 
and an imprisonment of at most 15 years, which can rise to an indefinite one if the terrorist act results in 





the death of any person. Title 18 USC 2339B - Providing material support or resources to designated 
foreign terrorist organizations defines that anyone that incurs in this unlawful conduct knowingly of the 
involvement of the organization in terrorist activities shall be fined and/or imprisoned for no more than 
15 years, or in the same case as before, for any period deliberated by the court if any person dies as a 
result of the terrorist act. If the offender is a financial institution which knowingly has in its possession 
funds related with terrorist organizations, the referred institution shall be fined in the higher amount 
between USD 50.000 and twice the amount of the referred funds. Finally, Title 18 USC 2339C – 
Prohibitions against the financing of terrorism defines that anyone who attempts, conspires or acts 
directly or indirectly willingly and unlawfully in order to provide or collect funds to be used by terrorist 
organizations or in terrorist acts, shall be fined and/or imprisoned for a maximum of 20 years. Also, this 
Title establishes that anyone that knowingly conceals funds to be used in terrorist acts shall be fined and 
imprisoned for no more than 10 years. 
 Concerning the USA PATRIOT Act, Subtitle A from Title 3 is comprised of sections about the 
duties of North American companies, national and international cooperation and duties when in a 
business situation with a foreign company of primary money laundering concern (USA PATRIOT Act). 
Section 312 displays the changes in legislation on CDD, where the duty of due diligence is 
explained, as well as the steps to be taken in an enhanced due diligence process, which shall be followed 
when the counterpart is under an offshore banking license or when it is under a banking license issued 
by a foreign country that has been designated either as non-cooperative to international AML 
procedures or principles or by the Secretary of Treasury as warranting special measures due to money 
laundering concerns. Another duty is established in Section 326, the duty of identification and 
verification of accountholders. Related to this Section, there are three minimum requirements: financial 
entities need to verify the identity of any person that wishes to open an account; those entities also 
need to maintain records of the information respecting to all their clients, in order to verify a person’s 
identity; and consulting lists shall be provided to financial entities with information about known or 
suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations by any government agency (USA PATRIOT Act). 
Section 314 regulates the national cooperation among financial institutions, regulatory 
authorities and law enforcement authorities in what concerns information sharing about individuals, 
entities and organizations involved in suspicious activities or transactions. In terms of international 
cooperation, there are sections 328 and 330 on the identification of originators of wire transfers and 
investigations of money laundering, financial crimes and the finances of terrorist groups, respectively. 
Section 311 contains the special measures to be taken whenever a financial institution is operating 
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outside the USA with an entity of primary money laundering concern. Financial entities shall: keep 
records of the identity of the participants in the transaction, as well as the identity of the beneficial 
owner of the funds involved and a description of the transaction itself; keep information on certain 
payable-through accounts and on certain correspondent accounts, as asked by the Secretary, with the 
identity of the client and which is comparable to that which the depository institution obtains in the 
ordinary course of business with respect to its customers residing in the USA (USA PATRIOT Act). 
Subtitle B relates to modifications made to the BSA, including amendments relating to reporting 
of suspicious activities, which establishes that, in most cases, the identity and the content of the report 
itself must be kept secret from all the actors in the transaction, independently of who has made the 
report. Finally, Subtitle C regulates on crimes related to cash smuggling and currency counterfeiting with 




1. Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Formulation
As explained before, money laundering and terro
worldwide due to the values involved and the organization evident in each offence. Therefore, given the 
last developments concerning the data gathering on these crimes, the official organizations AML/CTF 
have established rules and regulations against them, such as the FATF Recommendations and Special 
Recommendations, followed by the evaluation of each country’s compliance with the third mutual 
evaluation report, in 2006. Figure 1, shown below, illustrates the diff
study in this dissertation – Portugal and the USA
  
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
 
Research Question 1: What is the impact that more legislation and greater awareness of the problem of 
money laundering have in terms of the reports delivered by subject entities?
 
Concerning the levels of compliance of these countries, both have discrepancies between their 
financial entities and DNFBP’s compliance levels, with the last ones being much less compliant than the 
first group. 
An example of this difference is observed in the STR or SAR reports presented by the obliged 
entities. Furthermore, the problem with the fill
also the quality, meaning that not always the reported transactions are truly suspicious, which by law is 
one of the premises that needs to be verified for the report to be made in both countries 
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H1: Concerning the environment described in research question 1, the number of STR’s or SAR’s filled in 
will increase. 
 With a more focused legislation and a greater awareness of the phenomenon of money 
laundering, it is possible to reach the conclusion that the better informed people inside the obliged 
entities are, the greater the number of reports filled in would become, due to their better evaluation of 
the money laundering suspicious situations. 
 However, if the number of reports being filled in was higher than it would be necessary, due to 
the lack of knowledge of the ones filling in the reports, the total number of reports can also decrease. In 
reality, in the medium to long term, quantity is expected to slowly decrease to an almost constant state 
as the quality of the reports increases, similar to a learning curve effect. 
 
H2: Concerning the environment described in research question 1, the quality of the STR’s or SAR’s filled 
in will increase. 
 It would be expected that with a better legislation and more information about the problem, the 
people involved would produce better results. 
 
Research Question 2: After the changes performed since 2006, what can be taken from the USA case in 
order to improve the Portuguese reality, in terms of its level of compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations? 
 
 FATF Recommendations and Special Recommendations are addressed by the assessed countries 
with the objective of improving their evaluated situation, increasing the number of compliant 
recommendations. This evolution is monitored by FATF, which produces reports every two years in 
order to provide information on the progress of each country’s situation, depending on the reports sent 
by the countries themselves on the legislation changes, for example. However, it is important to denote 
that these reports are not equal to the ones from mutual evaluations, which only happen every 6 years, 
with the next being scheduled to 2012. 
 After these biennial reports on the Portuguese situation, it becomes imperative to compare the 
current compliance situation of both countries, providing guidance to possible ways of improving 




H3: Nowadays, the level of compliance with FATF Recommendations is similar in both Portugal and the 
USA. 
After 5 years and almost in a year of a new mutual evaluation, it is expected that Portugal has 
already solved, if not all, most of the non-compliant status recommendations. If this is not the case for 
all of them, the USA may have possible solutions to Portuguese problems. 
2. System Compliance with FATF Recommendations 
 According to each country’s individual level of compliance of the FATF Recommendations and 
Special Recommendations, FATF has attributed a degree of compliance to each recommendation for 
both Portugal and the USA (see Appendix 2 – Table 5). This analysis will allow for a study on the 
evolutionary trends of the levels of compliance of both countries, in addition to the understanding of 
how the situation was immediately after the third mutual evaluation in 2006. 
 Portugal is: totally compliant (C) with recommendations 4, 8, 10, 14, 19, 20, 28, 35, 36, 37, 38, 
39 and 40; largely in compliance (LC) with recommendations 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26, 
27, 29, 30, 31 and with special recommendations II, IV, V, VI, VIII and IX; partially compliant (PC) with 
recommendations 7, 12, 16, 24, 25, 32, 33 and 34 and with special recommendations I, III ; and non-
compliant (NC) with recommendation 6 and with special recommendation VII. In this reality, 
Recommendation 9 does not apply, as financial institutions are not allowed to rely on intermediaries or 
other third parties to perform some elements of the customer due diligence process. 
 On the other hand, the USA is: totally compliant (C) with recommendations 2, 4, 14, 18, 19, 20, 
25, 27, 28, 29, 37 and 40 and with special recommendations II, VIII and IX; largely in compliance (LC) 
with recommendations 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 23, 26, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 38 and 39 and 
with special recommendations I, III, IV, V, VI and VII; partially compliant (PC) with recommendations 5 
and 24; and non-compliant (NC) with recommendation 12, 16, 33 and 34. 
Both countries show fairly good compliance levels with FATF Recommendations and Special 
Recommendations, as shown in the graphs
12
 presented below, where it is also possible to verify that 
both countries totally or largely comply with the majority of the recommendations proposed by FATF. 
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Although the USA has a higher 
weight on NC recommendations, it also has 
the higher percentage of LC and C 
recommendations (85%). On the other hand, 
Portugal has its weights divided between PC, 
LC and C recommendations (97,4%) (see 





In terms of Special Recommendations, 
the USA’s situation is much more favorable 
than the one of Portugal, as the first has a high 
level of compliance (100% of LC and C special 
recommendations), while Portugal do not have 
any C special recommendations, having the 
most special recommendations rated as LC 
(66,7%) (see Appendix 1 - Table 4). 
 
 
3. Sources and Data Collection 
In order to compare Portugal and the USA in the hypothesis defined, an exploratory study will 
be performed. 
In the research presented in the following chapter, both descriptive and quantitative data will 
be used, in order to have a well supported reasoning. All the data collected and used here on depictures 
faithfully both the Portuguese and the American realities, as it was gathered from institutional and 
reliable sources. 
 
NC PC LC C
Portugal 1 2 6 0









Figure 3: Level of Compliance 
with FATF Special 
Recommendations
NC PC LC C
Portugal 1 8 17 13











With the purpose of testing H1, data was collected from UIF and FinCEN reports concerning the 
number of STR’s made by obliged entities in the period from 2006 to 2010. The data collected was 
organized in tables and later used to create graphs that show the future evolution of the variable in 
study. One should take into consideration when observing the results presented in the next chapter that 
the data referring to the USA Fiscal Year represents the period starting in October 1
st
 and ending in 
September 30
th
, while in Portugal the Fiscal Year goes from January 1
st
 to December 31
st
. 
In the case of H2, the information collected about the number of investigations was taken from 
the Criminal Investigation figures, present in the IRS website, for the USA and from the UIF annual 
reports for Portugal, while the data on the number of reports came from H1. With these statistics a ratio 
was formed – report quality ratio – which indicates the quality of the reporting of each country in the 
period being studied. Again, a graphical analysis was made to verify the evolution of the results. 
Finally, addressing H3, the data collection was made from the updates of 2008 and 2010 to the 
FATF third mutual evaluation report for Portugal and from the FATF mutual evaluation reports of 2006 
for Portugal and the USA. This information was analyzed, in what concerns the recommendations in 
study in this hypothesis, in first place to create the table on the compliance evolution in Portugal, with 
the data available on the reports from 2008 and 2010, and then to create a comparative perspective 




IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter the data, both descriptive and quantitative, and the results obtained with its 
treatment will be analyzed in order to reach concrete conclusions that are able to clarify the hypothesis 
and answer the research questions proposed in the previous chapter. 
 
1. Reports Evolution 
Portugal 
 Since the third mutual evaluation in 2006, there were some changes in the Portuguese AML/CTF 
environment, in order to comply with the recommendation made by FATF. Besides the tangible 
modifications in legislation, for instance, with the revocation of Law 11/2004, of 27 March, and the 
establishment of Law 25/2008, of 5 June, there was an increase in consciousness of the extent of crimes 





Source: UIF (2006); UIF (2007); UIF (2008) ; UIF (2009) ; UIF (2010) (adap.) 
 
In Portugal, as illustrated in the graph above, the total number of STR’s had its peak in 2008, 
having decreased every year since then (see Appendix 3 – Table 6). Greatly responsible for that 
reduction were the DNFBP’s, which reports correspond to the majority of reports, being approximately 
90% of total reports in most of the period in analysis (see Appendix 3 – Table 7), following the trend of 
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the total. With much lower numbers appear financial entities (FE) and Other
14
, even though both of 
these sectors have increased their responsiveness during the period in study. 
 However, when one closely analyzes DNFBP’s reports, it is perceivable that they do not all result 
from suspect operations. In fact, many times, they “do not present any reason for suspicion other than 
the amount of the transaction”(UIF, 2010), which is insufficient, as the operation has to be suspicious by 
itself. An especially representative example of these entities are casinos, since these obliged entities 
have one of the greatest percentages of reports that do not result in any suspicious activity. Since 2006 
and until 2009, from 60.504 STR’s from casinos, no operation has been marked as suspicious (UIF, 2006; 
UIF, 2007; UIF, 2008; UIF, 2009). 
 With the great influence that DNFBP’s have on the total number of reports, along with the large 
impact of casinos’ STR’s inside this figure, what would be the modifications seen in the total reports 
graph when analyzing this reality without the influence of casinos’ reports? 
 
 
Source: UIF (2006); UIF (2007); UIF (2008) ; UIF (2009) ; UIF (2010) (adap.) 
 
 
In effect, casinos’ reports were severely influencing the total number of reports, not only in 
quantity and quality, but also in their quantity evolution in time. Without counting these reports, the 
total number of reports is increasing in Portugal since the third mutual evaluation, with FE’s being the 
                                                          
14
 Customs are always considered as in the Other group in this dissertation, once they are not subject entities, 
reporting without obligation, while in the annual reports of the Portuguese FIU they only belong to the Other 
group in 2010. 
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entities with the most reports filled in during most of the time, together with a great increase in the 
reports of Others in 2010. Excluding casinos, DNFBP’s represent only a very small portion of the total 





 In the USA the situation is different from Portugal, not only because the universe of obliged 
entities reporting is much bigger, but also because these reporting entities differ in some aspects from 
Portugal. 
 According to the third mutual evaluation report on the USA, one of the main topics of 
Recommendation 16’s faults is the fact that the only sector of DNFBP’s that reports suspicious 
transactions in the country are casinos. Furthermore, only recently (since 2003) have the insurance 
sector companies started to comply with the reporting requirement, which makes it more difficult to 
gather information on the development of money laundering crimes. 
 
 
Source: FinCEN (2011) (adap.) 
 Besides the distinctions from the Portuguese reality already pointed out, from the graph above 
it is possible to conclude that FE’s are the main sector reporting suspicious operations, with DNFBP’s 
being responsible only for a small portion of the reporting activity, as they are only constituted by the 
casinos’ sector. 
                                                          
15
 It is important to denote that this observation (about casinos in Portugal) does not have the objective of 
discouraging DNFBP’s or casinos themselves from reporting suspicious activities as they find suitable. However, 
this way of reporting, as it has been done in the years in study, becomes unfruitful for the analysis of the total 
number of reports and its evolution and also very difficult to investigate for the authorities, due to its size and to 
the heavy weight that would be put onto the investigation infrastructure. 
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 Excluding the year of 2009, the number of requests has always been increasing, with both FE’s 
and DNFBP’s being responsible for that rise (Appendix 3 – Table 8). However, even though DNFBP’s 
reports have continued to grow in 2009, the overwhelming size of the FE report sample (always close to 
100%, although dropping – Appendix 3 – Table 9) provoked the decrease in the number of reports in the 
last couple of years. This high significance of the FE sector deserves greater attention. 
 
Source: FinCEN (2011) (adap.) 
When addressing each sector inside the FE group, it is visible that all of them display distinct 
patterns of growth, with an almost inverse variation between depository institutions and MSB’s from 
2007 onwards. Moreover, in the FE group, the hierarchy of sectors with the highest number of reports 
has remained unchanged, with depository institutions at the leading position and securities and futures 
institutions much lower than the other two sectors (see Appendix 3 – Table 8). 
 
 Summarizing, the main differences between Portugal and the USA in this matter are the 
opposite proportions for each group, FE’s and DNFBP’s, the obliged entities which report and the great 
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Table 1 – Differences Between the Reporting Situation in Portugal and the USA 
Portugal USA 
• DNFBP’s have a total number of reports 
much higher than FE’s 
• Every entity mentioned in the Literature 
Review chapter is obliged to report every 
suspicious activity, every time that activity 
respects the parameters defined by law 
• The highest number of reports made in a 
year was of 22.733. 
• FE’s represent almost 100% of the 
reporting entities 
• All the FE’s report, although insurance 
companies do it for only a few years. In 
the DNFBP group only casinos report 
suspicious activities 
• In 2010 1.326.628 reports were filled in 
and, since 2006, the total number of 
reports was always higher than 1M. 
 
 Due to the huge difference in size between both countries, it would not be accurate to compare 





As presented in the graph above, Portugal has had a much higher growth rate of the number of 
reports from 2007 to 2008, a period in which the USA has maintained its values almost constant. 
However, as explained before, this great variation in the Portuguese situation occurred as a result of the 
reporting from DNFBP’s, in particular casinos. From that period on both countries have been decreasing 
their number of reports, although the decrease rate is much lower for the USA than for Portugal, 
excluding the last period, in which the USA has inverted its previous tendency, having grown slightly (see 
























2. Reports Quality 
Besides the total number of reports evolution analysis, it is also important to evaluate the 
reports quality level. Thus, the following ratio will be used, as a measure of ratio quality: 
Quality Reporting Ratio = Total No. of Investigations 
      Total No. of Reports 
The Quality Reporting Ratio determines the number of investigations that are started for each 
report that is filled in. Ultimately, this ratio shows if the reports being sent are really suspicious money 
laundering or terrorism financing situations. 
 
 
 After applying this ratio to the countries being studied it is possible to say that Portugal is in a 
better situation concerning the quality of its reporting. In fact, while the USA has much more reports 
due to its larger structure and size, they are not all relevant for investigation. 
 Furthermore, Portugal’s curve has a greater slope than the one of the USA, indicating that the 
first one’s reports quality is increasing more than the last. In fact, the USA is almost constant in terms of 
report quality as its values only very slightly change (Appendix 4 – Table 11 and 12). 
 
3. Improving Compliance Levels 
a. Portuguese Evolution 
Before the comparison between Portugal and the USA, it is pivotal to verify which were the 
changes made in terms of the level of compliance of Portugal to the FATF Recommendations since 2006. 
2008 2009 2010
Portugal 2,50% 4,17% 6,62%









Figure 9: Quality Reporting Ratio
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Mostly until the end of 2008, many changes have been made, especially in the Portuguese 
AML/CTF legislation, in order to turn the recommendations which were rated NC or PC in 2006 to a state 
of compliance. Table 2 below lists the recommendations to which Portugal was rated NC or PC in 2006 
and the main changes made from that year until the end of 2010: 
Table 2 – Portuguese Actions to Comply with FATF Recommendations 
Recommendation No. Main Actions Taken: 
6 – Politically Exposed 
Persons 
• Enhanced Due Diligence requirements were defined in Law 25/2008, of 5 
June 
• The same Law also determines a detailed definition of PEP 
• Law 25/2008, of 5 June, establishes an enhanced due diligence duty for 
transactions with foreign PEP’s 
• Finally, the regulatory institutions (BdP, CMVM and ISP) issued regulations 
requiring financial institutions to obtain information from their clients in a 
business relationship. 
7 – Correspondent 
Banking 
Law 25/2008, of 5 June, institutes an enhanced due diligence to financial 
institutions every time these establish correspondent banking relationships 
with foreign institutions. 
12 – DNFBP (R. 5, 6, 8-
11) 
• All the DNFBP’s are subject to the Portuguese AML/CTF legal framework, 
being addressed in Law 25/2008, of 5 June, all the duties towards AML and 
CTF and the CDD measures needed to be taken in any suspicious transaction 
• Also, the PEP definition and the enhanced due diligence obligation include 
DNFBP’s. 
16 – DNFBP (R. 13-15 & 
21) 
• Law 25/2008, of 5 June, clarifies that neither the Bar Association nor the 
Chamber of Solicitadores retain information on the reporting of suspicious 
transactions to the FIU and the Attorney General of the Republic made by 
lawyers and solicitadores 
• Several training sessions were provided to the workers from DNFBP’s, such 
as the ones from the Chamber of Solicitadores, the Service of Gambling 
Inspection, the Chamber of Chartered Accountants, the Order of Statutory 
Auditors and the Institute for Registers and Notaries 
• Law 25/2008, of 5 June, also enforces DNFBP’s supervision authorities to 
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issue warnings with the identification of countries and jurisdictions that do 
not apply the FATF Recommendations in a satisfactory manner, making it 
compulsory for DNFBP’s to identify the country of origin of their counterpart 
in any foreign transaction 
• Finally, from 2008 to 2010 the number of sanctions for DNFBP’s has risen. 




• Until the issuance of Law 25/2008, of 5 June, ASAE was the institution with 
the most important number of DNFBP’s, such as the real estate sector and 
the exchange of high value goods 
• The INCI (Institution for Construction and Real Estate) was created in order 
to manage reports coming from the real estate sector, in the place of ASAE 
• Finally, the Statutory Auditors Statute was adapted in conformity with Law 
25/2008, of 5 June, and with the internal law of Directive no.2006/43/EC, of 
17 May. 
Until 2010: 
• The INCI, the Institute for Registrars and Notaries, the Bar Association and 
the Chamber of Solicitadores, the Order of Chartered Accountants and the 
Order of Statutory Auditors each published pieces of information, in order to 
raise the awareness of the people in each of these DNFBP sectors. 
25 – Guidelines & 
Feedback 
• Most DNFBP’s oversight authorities have developed guideline reports, 
already referred in Recommendation 24. In addition to the entities 
mentioned, the ASAE and the Gambling Inspection also issued in 2008 those 
same reports 
• The feedback on the results and follow-up of the communications on 
money laundering and terrorism financing from the reporting entities is in 
charge of the Portuguese FIU. In practice, this already happened prior to 
2008, but it was only legislated on that year. 
32 – Statistics • The General Directorate for Justice Policy, responsible for the justice and 
law enforcement statistical data, has started a reformulation of the Statistics 
Information System, with data being collected from the cases present in 
court, defendants and convicted persons in criminal courts of first instance 
37 
 
• The main information collected consists of the amount of frozen, seized 
and confiscated assets for the State, the amount of money laundering 
enquiries, accusations and convictions, the number of crimes of terrorist 
organizations and the number of cross-border cash declarations, for 
example. 
33 – Legal Persons – 
Beneficial Owners 
Besides the existing obligation for companies to register in the National 
Registry of Legal Persons and, for commercial companies, in the Commercial 
Register, where all the information about the company and its owners is 
stored, Law 25/2008, of 5 June, requires from the obliged entities the 
identification of the beneficial owner of legal persons. 
34 – Legal 
Arrangements – 
Beneficial Owners 
• Even though trusts are not contemplated in the Portuguese legislation, 
they are allowed in the Madeira Free Trade Zone 
• In this territory, there is a Commercial Register Department of the Free 
Trade Zone, responsible for the management of the registries of trusts in the 
Madeira Free Trade Zone, which is also subject to the AML/CTF Law 
25/2008, of 5 June, being obliged to report any suspicious operations 
regarding the creation or management of trusts. 
Source: FATF (2008); FATF (2010) 
 In effect, with the actions enumerated before, Portugal has become either totally compliant (C) 
or largely compliant (LC) with all FATF Recommendations, as these changes correspond to most of the 
topics pointed out by the FATF in the third mutual evaluation report. 
The same applies to FATF Special Recommendations, which were not mentioned in the previous 
table, because most of the changes performed (in the ones that Portugal was NC or PC) were originated 
by UE regulations, such as Regulation (EC) no.1781/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council, of 
15 November, which became effective in European countries after its approval (FATF, 2008; FATF, 2010). 
 
b. Comparison with the USA 
 Firstly, it is important to refer that, in order to improve the Portuguese levels of compliance, the 
comparison will be made exclusively between recommendations which level of compliance is higher in 
the USA than in Portugal. 
 According to the 2006 levels of compliance of both countries, the recommendations 
corresponding to this condition were: 2, 6, 7, 18, 25, 27, 29 and 32. However, nowadays the situation 
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has changed, as explained in table 2, thus reducing the number of recommendations available for a 
comparison. 
 Recommendations 6 and 7, which were NC and PC in 2006, respectively, are now totally 
compliant after the modifications explained previously. Recommendation 18 has become C, due to the 
creation of article 30 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June, referring to shell banks. Recommendations 2, 27 and 29 
only have effectiveness issues preventing total compliance, with recommendation 2 being the one with 
the greatest developments in the latest years, since the legal persons’ liability in cases of money 
laundering is now established in article 46 of Law 25/2008, of 5 June. 
 Therefore, recommendations 25 and 32 are the ones that can benefit from the comparison 
between Portugal and the USA16. Although these have already been modified from 2006 to 2010, they 
still need some adjustments in order to be totally compliant. 
 
Recommendation 25 
 In terms of the issuance of guidance reports, the main distinction between both countries is that 
the USA started informing its DNFBP’s about the AML/CTF framework much sooner than Portugal. In 
fact, while Portugal started elaborating guidance reports for its DNFBP’s after the establishment of Law 
11/2004, of 27 March, the USA elaborated its first AML/CTF guidance report in 1998. Furthermore, in 
2004, the only DNFBP’s oversight entities that issued guidance reports specific for their sector were the 
IGAE (now ASAE) and the IGJ. In the USA, by 2004, sectors inside the DNFBP’s which already had several 
guidance reports included casinos, dealers in precious metals and stones and lawyers. 
 These different traits in both countries show that North American DNFBP’s were informed 
sooner of their obligations when dealing with money laundering situations, which may have given them 
a greater know-how about suspicious situations. 
 Nonetheless, today both countries are increasingly closer in terms of DNFBP guidance, as 
Portuguese oversight entities have already issued specific sector reports in several sectors, as shown in 
Table 2. Even so, besides publishing sector specific reports, DNFBP oversight entities could promote 
educational conferences, similarly to what happens in the USA with Lawyers, for example. These 
conferences are focused mainly on compliance issues and the impact that AML laws have on the specific 
activities of each sector (FATF, 2006 - USA). 
 
                                                          
16
 Although today the Portuguese level of compliance with recommendation 32 is similar to the one in the USA, a 
comparison of the present situation is important due to the poor statistic evidence in Portugal until the third 




 Concerning the statistics gathered, the situation of both countries in terms of their compliance is 
fairly similar to the one enunciated for recommendation 25. The USA has begun detailing AML/CTF 
statistics for a longer period, having nowadays more detailed information. 
However, Portugal has immensely progressed, especially since the third mutual evaluation of 
2006. Nowadays, both countries have very similar statistics reported in general, such as the number of 
money laundering enquiries, accusations and convictions or the amount of reports received by each FIU. 
The main sources of statistics in both cases are the FIU’s reports, FinCEN for the USA and UIF for 
Portugal. 
Between the information provided by these FIU’s the great difference is the depth to which the 
reports from each of the reports go into. While the Portuguese reports have the number of reports 
made to the FIU and, in some years, the distribution of these reports by region, the North American 




V. MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
1. Conclusion 
 
Research Question 1: What is the impact that more legislation and greater awareness of the problem of 
money laundering have in terms of the reports delivered by subject entities? 
H1: Concerning the environment described in research question 1, the number of STR’s or SAR’s filled in 
will increase. 
Firstly, it is important to refer that, from 2006 to 2010, the total number of reports has 
increased in the first years in the USA, being now almost constant, without having a clear trend in 
Portugal. However, when removing casinos from the universe of reporting entities in Portugal (according 
to the logic explained in the previous chapter), the total number of reports increases substantially. 
Moreover, assuming this situation for Portugal, financial entities are the main reporting sector in 
both countries. DNFBP’s are well below the financial entities mark in the USA and in Portugal, being 
almost constant, which evidences a situation that needs to be addressed, with better information for 
the obliged entities of this sector. Logically, with casinos in the picture, DNFBP’s are always the sector 
with most reports in Portugal, although in this case, they do not evidence any trend in terms of increase 
or decrease of the number of STR’s. 
 
H2: Concerning the environment described in research question 1, the quality of the STR’s or SAR’s filled 
in will increase. 
In terms of the quality of the reports filled in, Portugal is in a better situation than the USA. In 
fact, Portugal displays an increasing quality report ratio during the whole period in study, which, with 
less obliged entities in conditions to report suspicious activities in terms of money laundering and 
terrorism financing than the USA, is superior to the almost constant and very low ratio for the USA. 
 
Therefore, the possibility of the decrease or the maintenance of a constant number of reports 
due to the quality level being sufficiently high is not happening in any of the countries. While Portugal is 
still increasing its quantity and quality of reports, both at the same time, the USA has still to improve the 





Research Question 2: After the changes performed since 2006, what can be taken from the USA case in 
order to improve the Portuguese reality, in terms of its level of compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations? 
H3: Nowadays, the level of compliance with FATF Recommendations is similar in both Portugal and the 
USA. 
Since 2006, a lot has changed in the level of compliance of Portugal to the FATF 
Recommendations, which were NC, PC and LC. The country has evolved greatly in terms of legislation, 
training and on the statistics presented. 
Nevertheless, even though the evolution has been positive, it is still possible to improve some 
aspects of the Portuguese reality. It was verified that some of these aspects were present in the USA 
situation. That was the case with guidance and guideline reports (recommendation 25) and statistics 
(recommendation 32). In the first one, the suggestion proposed is the creation of educational 
conferences for DNFBP’s, focused on compliance issues, since these entities have greater difficulties in 
the identification of suspicious money laundering activities. In the second one, although both countries 
are already similar in terms of the information presented, Portugal could also cross information between 
the monthly amount of reports and the Portuguese geographical region where it took place. 
Finally, although there are still remarks to be done to the Portuguese compliance situation, it 
needs to be highlighted that the USA and Portugal are now becoming increasingly similar, when 
comparing their compliance levels, especially in the recommendations in which the USA was much 
better than Portugal in the third mutual evaluation of 2006. 
 
All in all, there is a positive evolution trend towards the full compliance with international 
regulations in both countries, along with the display of good local practices in terms of the prevention of 
money laundering and terrorism financing. On the other hand, both Portugal and the USA need to 
discover a suitable approach, so that the reporting situations are better judged by the obliged entities, 
especially for the DNFBP sector. This is vital, because even if a country has all the mechanisms put into 
practice, through laws and regulations for example, if a great number of its obliged entities does not act 
as they are supposed to, the regulations are not put into practice. This enhanced judgment will provide 
better information and more comprehensive statistics in what concerns the crimes of money laundering 
and terrorism financing. 
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2. Limitations and Future Research 
The main limitation of this study was the little amount of information available about the topic 
studied, especially in a country-wide level. This is particularly true in the case of Portugal, where there is 
a scarce number of studies about the AML/CTF frameworks, either foreign or internal (the most in-depth 
ones are from the Portuguese FIU). Furthermore, in the existing reports, in both Portugal and the USA, 
the statistics are not as thorough as wanted by the authors due to the short responsiveness in terms of 
reporting, especially from DNFBP’s. 
In terms of future research about AML, at large, it is possible to perform a study discussing the 
distinct definitions of PEP, presenting the most suitable one as a solution. Another option is to study 
whether the costs related with the institution of measures to detect and prevent against suspicious 
transactions and activities, such as CDD and, in special cases, the enhanced CDD, are in line with the 
results obtained. 
Additionally, in particular about the problem addressed in this dissertation, another future 
research possibility is to develop other quality report indicators, in order to test the results presented in 
this dissertation. In addition, a same study as the one presented here can be carried out having as 
subject of study the obliged entities of a specific sector (either financial entities or DNFBP’s), so that it 
would be possible to determine the reasons for the amount of reports displayed in each of them, as well 


















Table 3 – COMPLIANCE FATF 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
  Portugal USA 
NC 1 2,6% 4 10,0% 
PC 9 23,1% 2 5,0% 
LC 17 41,0% 22 55,0% 
C 13 33,3% 12 30,0% 
Total 39  40  
Table 4 – COMPLIANCE FATF SPECIAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
  Portugal USA 
NC 1 11,1% 0 0,0% 
PC 2 22,2% 0 0,0% 
LC 6 66,7% 6 66,7% 
C 0 0,0% 3 33,3% 
Total 9  9  
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Appendix 2: Recommendations and Compliance in Each Country 
 
Table 5 - Recommendations and Compliance in Each Country 




Summary of Factors 
Underlying Rating 
Rating 
Summary of Factors 
Underlying Rating 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 
1. ML Offense LC The statistics that are available 
suggest doubts as to the 
effectiveness of the ML offenses 
in Portugal given the low 
number of convictions. 
LC • The list of domestic predicate 
offenses does not fully cover 2 
out of the 20 designated 
categories of offenses 
specifically (insider trading and 
market manipulation and 
piracy) 
• The list of foreign predicate 
offenses does not cover 8 out of 
the 20 designated categories of 
offenses 
• The definition of “transaction” 
in s.1956(a)(1) means that 
mere possession as well as 
concealment of proceeds of 
crime , does not constitute the 
laundering of proceeds 
• The definition of “property” in 
relation to the section 
1956(a)(2) offense 
(international money 
laundering) only includes 
monetary instruments or funds. 




LC • Criminal liability for ML does 
not clearly extend to legal 
persons. However, law 11/2004 
foresees a range of proportional 
and dissuasive sanctions that 
can be applied to legal persons. 
• The statistics that are 
available suggest doubts as to 
the effectiveness of the ML 
offenses in Portugal given the 





LC Only a small amount of money 
has been confiscated which may 
reflect on the effectiveness of 
the system. 
LC • Where the proceeds are 
derived from one of the 
designated categories of 
offenses that are not domestic 
or foreign predicate offenses 
for ML, a freezing/seizing or 
confiscation action cannot be 
based on the money laundering 
offense 
• Property of equivalent value 
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which may be subject to 
confiscation cannot be 
seized/restrained. 
PREVENTIVE MEASURES 




C - C - 
5. Customer due 
diligence 
LC • There is no specific, explicit, 
requirement for CDD for 
occasional wire transfers that 
are not suspicious, under SR VII 
below €12,500 
• Identification requirements for 
beneficial owners are not 
completely contained in law, but 
also in supervisors instructions 
• For some entities in securities 
sector that are not covered by 
BdP regulations (venture capital 
companies and securitization 
companies) the CMVM 
regulations do not explicit 
comply with some requirements 
regarding identification of 
beneficial owners of legal 
persons, ongoing due diligence, 
failure to satisfy complete CDD. 
There are no provisions for 
securities sector that impose the 
duty to scrutiny transactions 
undertaken throughout the 
course of the relationship to 
ensure that these transactions 
are consistent with the 
institutions knowledge of the 
customer, their business and 
risk profile and where 
necessary, the source of funds. 
Regulations for the securities 
sector do not provide explicit 
mention of the refusal to open 
accounts or carry out 
transactions, or to making a 
suspicious transaction report 
• In regard to low risk situations 
particularly the application of 
situations with EU and FATF 
members (when there is no 
suspicion of ML) some of the 
current exemptions mean that, 
PC • No obligation in law or 
regulation to identify beneficial 
owners except in very specific 
circumstances (i.e. 
correspondent banking and 
private banking for non-U.S. 
clients) 
• No explicit obligation to 
conduct ongoing due diligence, 
except in certain defined 
circumstances 
• Customer identification for 
occasional transactions limited 
to cash deals only 
• No requirement for life 
insurers issuing covered 
insurance products to verify 
and establish the true identity 
of the customer, (except for 
those insurance products that 
fall within the definition of a 
“security” under the federal 
securities laws) 
• No measures applicable to 
investment advisers and 
commodity trading advisors 
• Verification of identity until 
after the establishment of the 
business relationship is not 
limited to circumstances where 
it is essential not to interrupt 
the normal course of business 
• No explicit obligation to 
terminate the business 
relationship if verification 
process cannot be completed 
• The effectiveness of 
applicable measures in the 
insurance sector (which went 
into force on 2 May 2006) 
cannot yet be assessed. 
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rather than reduced or 
simplified CDD measures, no 
CDD measures apply 
whatsoever for these cases 
• There is no explicit mention of 
TF in relation to the duty of CDD 
in suspicious transactions 
• Issue of effectiveness of the 
supervisors instructions due to 
the short period of time since 
their entry into force (June/July 
2005). 
6. PEP’s NC • There is no requirement for 
appropriate risk management 
systems to determine whether a 
potential customer, a customer 
or the beneficial owner is a PEP 
• There is no legal requirement 
for financial institutions to 
obtain senior management 
approval for establishing 
business relationships with a 
PEP nor to take reasonable 
measures to establish the source 
of wealth and the source of 
funds 
• It is not so clear about 
effectiveness in practice in part 
due to some confusion about 
national versus international 
PEPs. 
LC • Measures relating to PEPs do 
not explicitly apply to MSBs, 
the insurance sector, 
investment advisers and 
commodity trading advisors. 
7. Correspondent 
banking 
PC • The obligation to gather 
information should be 
applicable to all respondent 
institution and not exempt 
institutions from EU members 
or FATF members. Article 2.8 of 
BdP Instruction 26/2005 does 
not include the explicit mention 
“including whether it has been 
subject to a ML or TF 
investigation or regulatory 
action.” 
• The requirement to obtain 
approval from senior 
management is not set up in 
legislation or regulation 
• There is no regulation with 
respect to payable-through 
accounts. 
LC • No obligation to require 
senior management approval 





C - LC • No explicit provision 
requiring life insurers MSBs, or 
investment advisers and 
commodity trading advisors to 
have policies and procedures 
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business for non face-to-face business 
relationships or transactions. 
9. Third parties 
and introducers 
N/A - LC • No explicit obligation on 
relying institution to obtain 
core information from 
introducer 
• No measures have been 
applied to investment advisers 
and commodity trading 




C - LC • Life insurers of covered 
products are only required to 
keep limited records of SARs, 
Form 8300s, their AML 




LC • There is no regulation to set 
forth findings in writing for 
those entities falling only under 
the regulations and supervision 
of the CMVM. 
LC • In the insurance, and MSB 
sectors, there is no specific 
requirement to establish and 
retain (for five years) written 
records of the background and 
purpose of complex, unusual 
large transactions or unusual 
patterns of transaction that 
have no apparent or visible 
economic or lawful purpose 
(outside of the SAR, CTR and 
Form 8300 requirements)  
• No measures have been 
applied to investment advisers 
and commodity trading 
advisors. 
12. DNFBP – R. 5, 
6 and 8 to 11 
PC • The deficiencies in the 
implementation of 
Recommendation 5, 6 and 11 
that apply to financial 
institutions also apply to 
DNFBPs 
• There are few implementation 
measures that clarify the specific 
obligations of DNFBPs (similar 
to regulations and circulars for 
financial institutions) 
• Portugal has not implemented 
explicit AML/CTF measures 
concerning PEPs applicable to 
DNFBPs 
• There is no requirement that 
DNFBPs have policies in place to 
deal with the misuse of 
technological developments 
(Recommendation 8) 
• More generally, the 
implementation of the FATF 
NC • Casinos are not required to 
perform enhanced due 
diligence for higher risk 
categories of customer, nor is 
there a requirement to 
undertake CDD when there is a 
suspicion of money laundering 
or terrorist financing (R.5) 
• Accountants, dealers in 
precious metals and stones, 
lawyers and real estate agents 
are not subject to customer 
identification and record 
keeping requirements that 
meet Recommendations 5 and 
10 
• None of the DNFBP sectors is 
subject to obligations that 
relate to Recommendations 6, 8 
or 11 (except for casinos in 
relation to R.11). 
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requirements (both ML and TF) 
by DNFBPs raises concerns 





LC • The low number of STRs filed 
by the financial entities by a 
limited number of financial 
institutions raises the issue of 
effectiveness of the reporting 
requirement. 
LC • The existence of a USD 5,000 
threshold for reporting 
suspicious activity 
• No measures have been 
applied to investment advisers 
and commodity trading 
advisors 
• The effectiveness of measures 
in the insurance and mutual 
funds sectors cannot yet be 
assessed. 
14. Protection & 
no tipping-off 





LC • There is no explicit regulation 
that the compliance officer 
should be at the management 
level 
• Training facilities for 
employees have been 
established but effectiveness 
could be improved especially in 
the insurance sector. 
LC • AML Program requirements 
have not been applied to 
certain non-federally regulated 
banks, investment advisers and 
commodity trading advisors 
• It is not yet possible to assess 
the effectiveness of these 
measures in the insurance 
sector 
• There is no obligation under 
the BSA for financial 
institutions to implement 
employee screening 
procedures. 
16. DNFBP – R. 13 
to 15 and 21 
PC • All DNFBPs are subject to 
comprehensive regulations with 
regard to reporting duties. 
However only 10 suspicious 
transactions were reported from 
2003 to 2005 
• No co-operation procedures 
have been so far established 
between the Bar Association and 
the Chamber of Solicitadores on 
the one hand, and the DCIAP or 
FIU/PJ, on the other hand. 
• Even though training is not 
satisfactory yet except in the 
area of casinos, the evaluation 
team noted the planning for 
improvements concerning this 
matter 
• There is no obligation to give 
special attention to business 
relationships and transactions 
with persons (including legal 
NC • Casinos are the only DNFBP 
sector that is required to report 
suspicious transactions; 
however, there is a threshold 
on that obligation 
• Accountants, lawyers, real 
estate agents and TCSPs are not 
subject to the “tipping off” 
provision or protected from 
liability when they choose to 
file a suspicious transaction 
report 
• Accountants, lawyers, real 
estate agents and TCSPs are not 
required to implement 
adequate internal controls (i.e. 
AML Programs) 
• Dealers in precious metals, 
precious stones, or jewels are 
required to implement AML 




persons) from or in countries 
which do not or insufficiently 
apply the FATF 
Recommendations 
• Sanctions provided by law are 
in particular proportionate, as 
fines have a wide range of 
amounts and Article 47 of Law 
11/2004 allows to imposition of 
supplementary penalties. 
However no sanctions have 
been imposed yet, except in the 
supervisory area of ASAE 
(formerly the IGAE). 
implementation cannot yet be 
assessed 
• There are no specific 
obligations on accountants, 
lawyers, real estate agents or 
TCSPs to give special attention 
to the country advisories that 
FinCEN has issued and which 
urge enhanced scrutiny of 
financial transactions with 
countries that have deficient 
AML controls. 
17. Sanctions LC • No sanctions have been 
imposed by the supervisors 
since Law 11/2004 (the main 
AML Law) came into effect, 
although some proceedings are 
pending. 
LC • Some banking and securities 
participants are not subject to 
all AML/CTF requirements and 
related sanctions at the federal 
level 
• The effectiveness of the 
measures in the insurance 
sector cannot yet be assessed 
• There are concerns about 
how effectively sanctions are 
applied in the MSB sector given 
the current level of the IRS’s 
resources. 
18. Shell banks LC • There is no explicit regulation 
that obliges financial institutions 
to satisfy themselves that 
respondent financial institutions 
in a foreign country do not 
permit their accounts to be used 
by shell banks. 
C - 
19. Other forms of 
reporting 
C - C - 









LC • The requirement to monitor 
business relationships and 
transactions from or in non-
cooperative countries, or for 
countries that do not or 
insufficiently apply FATF 
Recommendations, is not clearly 
articulated in the law, although 
the BdP is able to require this 
through circular letters 
• There does not appear to be a 
LC • In the insurance sector, there 
is no specific requirement to 
establish and retain written 
records of transactions with 
persons from/in countries that 
do not or insufficiently apply 
the FATF Recommendations 
• No measures have been 
applied to investment advisers 




mechanism for advising 
institutions about concerns on 
weakness in AML/CTF systems 




LC • An explicit regulation that 
requires institutions to pay 
particular attention to their 
branches and subsidiaries in 
countries which do not or 
insufficiently apply the FATF 
recommendations is missing 
• There is no definite legal 
obligation that, where the 
minimum AML/CTF 
requirements of the home and 
host countries differ, branches 
and subsidiaries in host 
countries are required to apply 
the higher standard, to the 
extent that local laws and 
regulations permit. 
LC • BSA requirements do not 
apply to the foreign branches 
and offices of domestic life 
insurers issuing and 





LC • Even though the three 
supervisors exercise 
comprehensive supervision on 
the basis of information 
provided by the financial 
entities themselves and audit 
reports the number of AML/CTF 
supervisory/regulatory visits is 
relatively low. 
LC • Some securities sector 
participants are not subject to 
supervision for AML/CTF 
requirements 
• The effectiveness of the 
measures in the insurance 
sector cannot yet be assessed 
• Concerns about IRS 
examination resources. 




PC • With regard to all DNFBPs 
competent authorities or SROs 
are designated to perform 
monitoring and ensuring 
compliance of DNFBPs with 
AML/CTF requirements. 
However except for the IGJ and 
IGAE/ASAE, no inspections or 
other monitoring activities were 
carried out by the competent 
authorities 
• Where an oversight role exists 
the SROs do not have sufficient 
resources to perform these 
functions. 
PC • There is no regulatory 
oversight for AML/CTF 
compliance for accountants, 
lawyers, real estate agents or 
TCSPs 
• The supervisory regime for 
Nevada casinos is currently not 
harmonized with the BSA 
requirements. 
25. Guidelines & 
Feedback 
PC • There is very little guidance 
provided to the DNFBPs under 
the new Law 11/2004 by the 
competent authorities, except 
for IGAE/ASAE and casinos. 
C - 
INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER MEASURES 
26. The FIU LC • The FIU is not the recognised 
competent authority to receive 
and analyse STRs in relation to 
LC • The effectiveness of FinCEN, 
is impeded by: 
- perceptions concerning the 
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TF. value of its products and the 
risk that overemphasis on 
FinCEN’s network function will 
weaken its place in the 
AML/CTF chain; 
- the handling of the huge 
amount of 14 million reports of 
which 70% are still filed in a 
paper format; 
- the fact that SAR filing is only 
done in 30-60 days after 
detection; and 
- insufficient adequate/timely 
feedback to reporting 
institutions 
• Since terrorism-related 
information in requests from 
foreign FIUs is shared with law 
enforcement—for 
networking—without the prior 
authorization of the foreign 
FIU, the U.S. does not act in 
accordance with international 
principles of information 





LC • There are relatively few ML 
prosecutions initiated. This 
raises effectiveness issues under 
the requirement of 
recommendation 27 to ensure 
that ML or TF cases are properly 
investigated [issue of 
effectiveness]. 
C - 
28. Powers of 
competent 
authorities 
C - C - 
29. Supervisors LC • Few sanctions have been 
imposed by the supervisory to 
date. The ISP and CMVM have 
not imposed any sanctions since 
the introduction of law 
11/2004. Therefore it is not 
possible to assess the 
effectiveness of the sanctions 





LC • DNFBPs are not adequately 
supervised for AML/CTF 
compliance. 
LC • The IRS is not adequately 
resourced to conduct 
examinations of the entities 
that it is responsible for 
supervising, in particular, the 





LC • Although formal co-operation 
may take place, there is still 








authorities, the FIU and 
prosecutors. 
LC • There remains a gap between 
the policy level and operational 
level law enforcement work 
• More refined coordination is 
needed amongst law 
enforcement agencies with 
overlapping jurisdictions. 
32. Statistics PC • Portugal has not conducted a 
full, complete and 
comprehensive review of its 
AML/CTF regime 
• There are no comprehensive 
statistics on ML and TF 
investigations, prosecutions and 
convictions. There are no TF 
statistics on which to judge the 
effectiveness of the TF 
legislation as no TF cases have 
been tried 
• More detailed statistics should 
be kept, particularly concerning 
the nature and disposition of 
investigations and prosecutions 
• It is not possible to assess the 
effectiveness of freezing of 
terrorist funds under Special 
Recommendation III as no funds 
have been identified for freezing 
action 
• There are very limited 
statistics on the number of cases 
and the amounts of property 
frozen, seized and confiscated 
relating to ML, TF and criminal 
proceeds 
• There are insufficient statistics 
upon which to assess the 
efficiency of the measures in 
place [issue of effectiveness SR 
IX]. 
LC • Freezing, seizing and 
confiscation statistics are not 
specified into ML and TF 
related seizures and 
confiscations 
• No statistics on TF related 
confiscations 
• FinCEN collects and maintains 
substantial valuable statistical 
BSA data, which can be used to 
provide a partial picture of the 
effectiveness of the U.S. 
AML/CTF regime; however, 
FinCEN’s data would need to be 
coupled with that of other 
federal agencies and 
departments in order to 
produce a comprehensive view 
of overall effectiveness of U.S. 
AML/CTF systems 
• MLA and extradition statistics 
are not broken down annually, 
and do not show the time 





PC • The National Register of Legal 
Persons does not include 
information on the beneficial 
ownership and the persons who 
control a legal person 
• There is not full transparency 
of the shareholders of 
companies that have issued 
bearer shares. 
NC • While the investigative 
powers are generally sound 
and widely used, there are no 
measures in place to ensure 
that there is adequate, accurate 
and timely information on the 
beneficial ownership and 
control of legal persons that 
can be obtained or accessed in 




• There are no measures taken 
by those jurisdictions which 
permit the issue of bearer 
shares to ensure that bearer 





PC • Competent authorities have 
limited powers to have timely 
access to information on the 
beneficial ownership and 
control of trusts. 
NC • While the investigative 
powers are generally sound 
and widely used, there is 
minimal information 
concerning the beneficial 
owners of trusts that can be 
obtained or accessed by the 
competent authorities in a 
timely fashion. 
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
35. Conventions C - LC • Not all conduct specified in 
Article 3 (Vienna) and Article 6 
(Palermo) has been 
criminalized, and there is not a 
sufficiently comprehensive list 
of foreign predicates related to 
organized criminal groups as 
required by Article 6(2)(c) 
(Palermo). 
36. Mutual legal 
assistance (MLA) 
C - LC • Dual criminality may impede 
MLA where the request relates 
to the laundering of proceeds 
that are derived from a 
designated predicate offense 
which is not covered. 
37. Dual 
criminality 
C - C - 
38. MLA on 
confiscation and 
freezing 
C - LC • Dual criminality may impede 
MLA where the request relates 
to the laundering of proceeds 
that are derived from a 
designated predicate offense 
which is not covered. 
39. Extradition C - LC • Dual criminality may impede 
extradition where the request 
relates to the laundering of 
proceeds that are derived from 
a designated predicate offense 
which is not covered 
• List-based treaties do not 
cover ML. 
40. Other forms of 
co-operation 








Rating Summary of Factors 
Underlying Rating 
Rating Summary of Factors 
Underlying Rating 
I. Implement UN 
instruments 
PC • S/RES/1267 has been 
implemented but S/RES/1373 
(2001) is not yet 
comprehensively implemented 
• There is no system for 
effectively communicating 
action taken by the authorities 
under the freezing mechanisms 
to some designated non-
financial business and 
professions 
• Designated non-financial 
businesses and professions are 
not adequately monitored for 
compliance with measures taken 
under the Resolutions. 
LC • Not all UN1267 
designations are transposed 
in the OFAC list. 
II. Criminalize TF LC • The TF offence does not extend 
to the provision or collection of 
funds for the benefit of a single 
terrorist 
• It is too early to assess the 
effective implementation of the 
TF offence provisions. 
C - 
III. Freeze and 
confiscate 
terrorist assets 
PC • Portugal has a limited ability to 
freeze funds in accordance with 
S/RES/1373 (2001) of 
designated terrorists outside the 
EU listing system 
• Communication mechanisms 
to some DNFBPs are limited 
• Portugal does not adequately 
monitor DNFBPs for compliance 
with the relevant laws for 
freezing of terrorist funds. 
LC • Compliance monitoring in 
non-federally regulated 
sectors (e.g. insurance, 
MSBs) is ineffective 
• Not all S/RES/1267(1999) 
designations are transposed 




LC • As the reporting obligation 
relates to suspected TF offences, 
the evaluation team had 
concerns regarding the scope of 
the TF offence (as discussed in 
section 2.2). This could limit the 
reporting obligation. 
LC • The existence of a USD 
5,000 threshold for reporting 
suspicious activity 
• No measures have been 
applied to investment and 
commodity trading advisers 
• The effectiveness of 
measures in the insurance 
and mutual funds sectors 
cannot yet be assessed. 
V. International 
co-operation 
LC • Since dual criminality may be 
required in for international 
cooperation it is not clear how 
Portugal would execute requests 




for MLA or extradition involving 
the collection/provision of 






LC • There is an absence of STRs 
coming from exchange offices 
[Effectiveness issue in relation 
to application of 
Recommendations 11 and 13] 
• As with other financial 
institutions overall 
implementation of related FATF 
Recommendations, in particular 
Special Recommendation VII, 
negatively impacts on the 
effectiveness of AML/CTF 
measures for money 
transmission services. 
LC • The limitations identified 
under Recommendation 5, 8, 
13 and SR.IV with respect to 
the MSB sector also affect 
compliance with Special 
Recommendation VI 
• Major concerns with 
respect to resources of the 
IRS for monitoring of this 
sector. 
VII. Wire transfer 
rules 
NC • Portugal has not implemented 
the full range of requirements of 
SR VII. There is no legal 
obligation to include full 
originator information in the 
message or payment form that 
accompanies a cross-border or 
domestic wire transfer 
• There are no obligations on 
intermediary reporting financial 
institutions in the payment 
chain to maintain all of the 
required originator information 
with the accompanying wire 
transfer 
• There are no obligations on 
beneficiary reporting financial 
institutions to adopt risk-based 
procedures for identifying and 
handling wire transfers that are 
not accompanied by complete 
originator information 
• There is no obligation to verify 
that the originator information 
is accurate and meaningful 
• There are no obligations to 
require financial institutions to 
apply risk-based procedures 
when originator information is 
incomplete 
• There are no sanctions for 
breaching many of the 
obligations under SR VII because 
many of the obligations 
themselves have not been 
implemented. 
LC • Threshold of USD 3,000 
instead of USD 1,000 as is 
required by the revised 
Interpretative Note 
• It is not mandatory to 
include all required 






LC • NPOs in Portugal should be 
required to maintain 
information on (2) the identity 
of the person(s) who own, 
control or direct their activities, 
including senior officers, board 
members and trustees. This 
information should be publicly 
available either directly from the 
NPO or through appropriate 
authorities 
• NPOs should have appropriate 
controls in place to ensure that 
all funds are fully accounted for 
and are spent in a manner that is 
consistent with the purpose and 
objectives of the NPO’s stated 
activities. 
• NPOs should follow a “know 
your beneficiaries and associate 
NPOs” rule, maintain, for a 
period of at least five years, and 
make available to appropriate 
authorities, records of domestic 
and international transactions 
• Appropriate authorities should 
monitor the compliance of NPOs 
with applicable rules and 
regulations. 
C - 
IX. Cash couriers LC • There are insufficient statistics 
upon which to assess the 
efficiency of the measures in 
place [issue of effectiveness]. 
C - 
 





Appendix 3: Number of Reports Filled In For Each Country – Evolution 
 
 
Table 6 - PORTUGAL - Total Number of Reports 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
FE 855  1.036  870   928  2.282 
DNFBP 15.180 11.438 21.157 12.865 6.188 
   Casinos 15.108 11.402 21.142 12.852 6.142 
   DNFBP (excluding casinos) 72 36 15 13 46 
Other 445 500 706 1.406 2.153 
   Customs 426 493 698 1.390 2.150 
Total 16.480 12.974 22.733 15.199 10.623 
Total (excluding casinos) 1.372 1.572 1.591 2.347 4.481 
Source: UIF (2006); UIF (2007); UIF (2008) ; UIF (2009) ; UIF (2010) (adap.) 
 
 
Table 7 - PORTUGAL - Reports of Each Area as a % of Total 
Reports 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
FE 5,19% 7,99% 3,83% 6,11% 21,48% 
DNFBP 92,11% 88,16% 93,07% 84,64% 58,25% 




Table 8 - USA - Total Number of Reports 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
FE     1.071.609        1.240.496        1.279.428        1.269.212   1.312.641   
   Depository Institutions         567.080           649.176           732.563           720.309        697.389   
   MSB's         496.400           578.439           531.761           530.518        596.494   
   Securities & Futures Institutions             8.129              12.881             15.104             18.385          18.758   
DNFBP             7.285                9.943             11.162             12.093          13.987   
Total     1.078.894        1.250.439        1.290.590        1.281.305     1.326.628   










Table 9 - USA - Reports of Each Area as a % of Total Reports 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
FE 99,32% 99,20% 99,14% 99,06% 98,95% 




Table 10 - Total Reports Variation: Portugal vs. USA 
  06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 
Total - PT -21,27% 75,22% -33,14% -30,11% 





Appendix 4: Quality Measures Calculations For Each Country 
 
 
Table 11 – PORTUGAL – Report Quality Ratio 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Investigations 584    724    568    634    703    
Reports 16.480    12.974    22.733    15.199    10.623    
Ratio 3,54% 5,58% 2,50% 4,17% 6,62% 
Source: UIF (2006); UIF (2007); UIF (2008); UIF (2009); UIF (2010) (adap.) 
 
 
Table 12 - USA – Report Quality Ratio
17
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Investigations n/a n/a 3.749    4.121    4.706    
Reports 1.078.894    1.250.439    1.290.590    1.281.305    1.326.628    
Ratio n/a n/a 0,29% 0,32% 0,35% 
Source: http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=107484,00.html (adap.) 
  
                                                          
17
 The data presented for the USA corresponds to North American Fiscal Years, which begins on October 1
st
 and 
ends in September 30
th
, while in Portugal it starts in January 1
st
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AML – Anti-Money Laundering 
ASAE – Autoridade de Segurança Alimentar e Económica 
BCP – Banco Comercial Português 
BdP - Banco de Portugal 
BES – Banco Espírito Santo 
BPI – Banco Português de Investimento 
BSA – Bank Secrecy Act 
C – Totally Compliant 
CDD – Customer Due Diligence 
CGD – Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
CMVM - Comissão de Mercado de Valores Mobiliários  
CTF – Counter Terrorism Financing 
DCIAP – Departamento Central de Investigação e Acção Penal 
DNFBP – Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
ESCB – European System of Central Banks 
EU – European Union 
FATF – Financial Action Task Force 
FE – Financial Entities 
FinCEN – Financial Crime Enforcement Network 
FIU – Financial Intelligence Unit 
IGAE – Inspecção Geral das Actividades Económicas 
IGJ – Inspecção-Geral de Jogos 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
InCI – Institute for Contruction and Real Estate 
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IRS – Internal Revenue Service 
ISP - Instituto de Seguros de Portugal 
LC – Largely Compliant 
MSB – Money Services Business 
NC – Non-compliant 
NCCT - Non-Compliant Countries and Territories 
NPO – Non-Profit Organization 
OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PC – Partially Compliant 
PEP – Politically Exposed Person 
PJ – Polícia Judiciária 
R – FATF Recommendation 
ROC – Revisor Oficial de Contas 
SAR – Suspicious Activity Report 
SR – FATF Special Recommendation 
STR – Suspicious Transaction Report 
TOC – Técnico Oficial de Contas 
UIF – Unidade de Informação Financeira 
UK – United Kingdom 
UN – United Nations 
UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
USA – United States of America 
USC – United States Code 
USD – United States Dollars 
